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1 Introduction
This article explores young people’s engagement
in the agri-food sector in Malawi against the
backdrop of two key related developments,
namely: the Farm Input Subsidy Programme
(FISP) and the Green Belt Initiative (GBI).
Young people are a critical constituency in
Malawi since they form more than half of the
total population, estimated at 13.1 million (NSO
2008), with potentially significant implications
for future trajectories of growth and
development.
Since the 2005/06 growing season, Malawi has
implemented a FISP which has been held as a
tremendous success (Dorward and Chirwa 2011).
The success has been underlined by the country’s
ability to produce a food surplus after almost two
decades of pervasive food insecurity and chronic
food shortages. Malawi is now able to feed itself
without taking recourse either to food aid or
commercial food imports. As a result of this
unprecedented success, Malawi features as a
model in international policy dialogue for other
countries on the African continent to emulate in
order to kickstart their fledging agricultural
sectors as engines of growth and sustainable
poverty reduction (UNESCO 2009; AGRA 2009;
Chinsinga 2010).
There is, however, intense debate about the
sustainability of the success of the FISP in
keeping Malawi both food secure and self-
sufficient. This debate is mainly led by a group of
donors sceptical about the efficiency and
effectiveness of the FISP in the use of valuable
inputs, aside from its affordability in the long
term (Dorward and Chirwa 2011). Questions
about the capacity of the government to properly
target beneficiaries to limit the potential
distortionary effects of subsidies, the impact of
consecutive years of favourable climatic patterns
on the success of the FISP and the opportunity
cost of resources invested in the programme are
among the many issues raised (Chirwa 2008;
Holden and Tostensen 2011). 
As a response to some of these questions, the
government is implementing the GBI to secure
the long-term food security and sufficiency gains
through the development of small and large-
scale irrigation schemes and maximisation of
rain-fed agriculture practices (Chingaipe et al.
2011). Under the GBI, the government has
committed itself to offer local and international
investors land amounting to about 1 million
hectares for irrigated agriculture. 
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However, a major concern is that the GBI is being
promoted at a time of virtual impasse in land
reforms intended to correct chronic imbalances in
land tenure and ownership patterns that have left
the vast majority of smallholder farmers virtually
landless (Chingaipe et al. 2011). The average per
capita land ownership in Malawi is estimated at
0.5 hectare. This is considered inadequate to the
extent that the land at the disposal of the majority
of smallholder farmers is described as ‘simply
providing a cushion or safety net that will provide
them with a base while their primary incomes
need to be generated elsewhere’ (Smith 1998).
The central argument of this article is that
young people are being marginalised in Malawi’s
green revolution success story because of stalled
land reforms and the absence of a supportive
policy infrastructure for their involvement in the
agri-food sector. The land reform impasse, which
is in the interest of the bureaucratic and political
elite, disempowers young people as key actors in
the sector. Since the transition to democracy in
1994, there have been no significant policy
pronouncements on young people’s role and
involvement in the agri-food sector. While clearly
prioritising the agricultural sector as the engine
of growth and poverty reduction, the overarching
development strategies such as the Poverty
Alleviation Programme (PAP) (1995), the
Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS)
(2001) and the Malawi Growth and Development
Strategy (MGDS) (2006) have been almost
totally silent on the role and involvement of
young people in the sector. The policy vacuum is
exacerbated by the reluctance of the young
experts in the sector to be deployed in the rural
areas to provide technical and extension support
services to farmers.
The article is based on fieldwork carried out in
two districts in southern Malawi: Zomba and
Mangochi. These districts were purposefully
chosen for two reasons. According to their
socioeconomic profiles, Zomba and Mangochi
have a disproportionate share of young people in
their demographic structures and highlight
serious concerns with increasing pressure on
arable land due to extensive estate farming.
They are among the densely populated districts
in Malawi. Mangochi and Zomba’s population
densities are estimated at 128 and 230 people
per square kilometre, respectively, compared to
the national average estimated at 139 people per
square kilometre. The major crops cultivated in
both districts are maize and tobacco, which are
grown as food and cash crops respectively.
Mangochi is bigger than Zomba in terms of total
land area. While Zomba covers a total land area
of 2,580 square kilometres, Mangochi’s total land
area is estimated at 6,273 square kilometres,
translating to about 6.7 per cent of Malawi’s
total land area (NSO 2008).
The fieldwork was entirely qualitative using focus
group discussions (FGD) and key informant
interviews with young people and Ministry of
Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development
(MoAI&WD) officials. A qualitative approach
because it provides a means of acquiring an in-
depth understanding of human behaviour
through the opportunity to explore issues,
understand phenomena and answer questions
(Bryman 2001; Campbell 2002). 
The following section examines the primacy of
agriculture in Malawi and particularly the role of
young people. It also examines briefly the FISP
and the GBI to set the context for the rest of the
discussion. The third section discusses the
empirical realities of young people’s engagement
in the agri-food sector highlighting constraints
and opportunities including implications for the
future of the sector. The final section reflects on
the missed opportunity to engage with young
people in rural areas, because they were
excluded from current development initiatives.
2 The primacy of agriculture, and young people
in Malawi
Agriculture is the principal source of livelihood
in Malawi. Up to 84 per cent of Malawians eke
their living directly out of agriculture which
contributes over 90 per cent to the country’s
export earnings, about 39 per cent of the
country’s GDP and accounts for 85 per cent of
total employment (Chirwa 2004; Chinsinga 2008).
The country’s agricultural sector has undergone
little notable transformation. Rather than
diminishing, the agricultural sector is becoming
increasingly dominant in the country’s overall
economic portfolio (Chinsinga 2002; Chirwa et al.
2006). This increase is partly attributed to the
devastating effects of structural adjustment
programmes on the manufacturing sector. The
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the
country’s GDP decreased from 16 to 11 per cent
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between 1994 and 2004 because of the total
collapse or relocation of industries to
neighbouring countries within the region. Agro-
processing constitutes 26 per cent of
manufacturing, less than 3 per cent of GDP
(Chinsinga 2008).
The overwhelming dominance of the agricultural
sector in the country’s overall economic portfolio
highlights the critical issue of access to land. It is
a significant determinant of whether a household
will be food secure, less vulnerable to risks and
shocks, and earn a living above the poverty line.
However, ownership of land and distribution is
highly unequal in Malawi. An estimated 70 per
cent of smallholders cultivate less than a hectare
and devote 70 per cent of their land to maize, the
main staple (Chirwa 2004; Chinsinga 2008).
Between 1.8 and 2 million smallholder farmers
cultivate on average 1 hectare or less, while
30,000 estates own or lease 10–500 hectares of
land each1 (Kanyongolo 2005).
The land problem contributes to what Dorward
and Chirwa (2011) refer to as the ‘low maize
productivity trap’ in Malawi where farmers with
small pieces of land continue to cultivate maize
even when it is not efficient for them to do so.
This is reinforced by high input prices and inter-
year maize price instability. The fear of low
maize prices does not make it attractive for
potential maize surplus producers to invest in
maize production, while the fear of high maize
prices forces maize deficit farmers to grow as
much maize as they can on their small pieces of
land even though they cannot afford high-
yielding seeds and fertiliser. The Farm Input
Subsidy Programme is a potential means of
breaking down the constraints that have locked
Malawi into a low maize productivity trap,
making high-quality farm inputs accessible to
the majority of smallholders who would
otherwise not have access to them.
The latest stalled land reforms are linked to the
democratisation project of the 1990s which
kicked off with a Presidential Commission of
Inquiry on Land Reform in 1996, culminating in
the development of a draft land policy endorsed
by the Cabinet in July 2002 (Peters and
Kambewa 2007). A Special Law Commission was
empanelled in 2003, tasked to review existing
land legislation and develop new legislation for
effective land administration by consulting as
widely as possible with relevant stakeholders.
The enabling legislative framework for the land
policy is yet to be promulgated into law although
the Special Law Commission wound up its work
more than seven years ago (Chinsinga 2011).
The impasse in implementation is attributed
mainly to the desire of the political and
bureaucratic elite to protect and defend their
own interests. Many acquired massive tracts of
land under the auspices of previous land reforms
which they are not prepared to give up even
though much of it lies idle.
This is precisely the concern with the Green Belt
Initiative: it does not target underutilised land
owned by the political and bureaucratic elite but
that owned by smallholder farmers (Chingaipe et
al. 2011), the majority of whom are grappling
with an acute shortage of land. The GBI is driven
by government’s realisation that a major
investment challenge encountered by big
farmers is the lack of large tracts of land viable
for commercial farming to realise the highest
possible economies of scale. Thus through the
GBI, the government has committed itself to
facilitate acquisition of almost 1 million hectares
of land, mainly from smallholder farmers. A
distinctive feature of the land grabs in Malawi is
that they are supply-driven. The government is
courting potential local and international
investors by offering them land to be acquired
from smallholder farmers for large-scale
irrigation schemes.
According to the GBI concept paper, it is inspired
by the painful memories of the severe drought
beginning in early 2001 which triggered three
consecutive years of hunger. By 2005, 5 million
people were affected by famine; while large
quantities of water flowed out of the country to
the ocean. The GBI is seen as a mechanism to
protect gains in food security, reduce
vulnerability to drought, and diversify crop
production by irrigating a million hectares of
land lying within 20km of the country’s three
lakes and 13 perennial rivers (GoM 2009). The
GBI is, however, not without critics. They argue
that the promises of job creation and foreign
exchange earnings through foreign investment
should not substitute the need for policies that
would grow domestic investment. As an
MoAI&WD official in Zomba District put it: ‘If
we allow foreigners to grab land in the Belt, we
will lose out on the market because they will be
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producing what they need for their countries
instead of us producing what they would need
and selling it to them.’
Malawi is dominated by a youthful population as
Figure 1 clearly illustrates. This has significant
implications for its future development in
various spheres, not least the agri-food sector.
However, the question of who exactly qualifies as
‘youth’ is not straightforward either
internationally or locally. The National Youth
Policy defines youth as all young people, female
and male, from the age of 14 to 25 years, while
acknowledging that youth is not a chronological
sequence but also a term used to describe roles
ascribed to the young (GoM 2008). The
implication is that the term ‘youth’ is employed
flexibly, so that young people less than 14 and
over 25 years can be accommodated depending
on their socioeconomic circumstances.
Several important programmes targeting young
people do not use the definition stipulated in the
National Youth Policy. The Malawi Rural
Development Fund (MARDEF) and the Youth
Enterprise Development Fund (YEDEF) designate
youth as males and females aged between 18 and
35. In proposals to revise the National Youth
Policy, youth will include all males and females
aged between 14 and 30. A further layer of
complexity comes about when young people are
considered in the agricultural context. According
to MoAI&WD officials ‘[youth] are those that
have not yet married or are living with a
guardian and are not able to support themselves’.
This suggests that in the agricultural sector, age
is not necessarily the factor used to distinguish
between youths and adults. Rather, youth are
essentially those who are not married and cannot
sustain themselves economically.
Competing perspectives are also manifested at
the international level with definitions of youth
varying tremendously. For instance, the United
Nations defines youth as all individuals aged
between 15 and 24, while the World Bank
expands the definition to include all young people
aged between 12 and 24. Overall, however, policy
discussions have been based on the premise that
the youth are in transition from childhood to
adulthood. As such, young people have specific
characteristics that make them a distinct
demographic and social category (Bennel 2007). 
Munthali (2010) views young people as a double-
edged sword. On the one hand they present an
unprecedented demographic dividend of human
resources, while on the other, the demographic
bonus could easily turn into a catastrophe if
young people are not equipped with the right
skills for the job market and more importantly
self-employment skills. In the case of Malawi,
this makes the agri-food sector a priority. The
Chinsinga and Chasukwa Youth, Agriculture and Land Grabs in Malawi70
Figure 1 Malawi population pyramid for 2010
Source Redrawn from www.nationmaster.com/country/mi-mal (accessed 9 March 2012).
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formal sector is very small, estimated at 500,000
jobs only and projected to shrink further due to
the devastating economic crisis affecting global
and national economies since 2007.
3 Youth and agriculture: empirical realities
3.1 Young people’s vision of ‘the good life’
It is striking that young people in our study do
not define their vision of ‘the good life’ with
reference to their involvement in the agriculture
sector. Conceptions mostly revolved around
‘owning a decent iron sheet roofed house, ready
availability of food and fashionable clothes for
our families, sending children to a good boarding
school and at least having a mountain bike and a
television screen’.2 Young people feel strongly
that their vision of ‘the good life’ cannot be
achieved by spending their time, and investing
their energies in, the agricultural sector. They
argue that life in farming is not only demanding
but also a huge gamble in view of the challenges
facing the sector. Young men at Chitenjere
Village, Malosa EPA, Zomba District observed
‘[one] can spend all his or her time in agriculture
but still be very poor while those who are bold
enough to venture out to the outside world can
prosper within a very short period of time’.
Young people singled out several factors
impeding prosperity in the agricultural sector,
which were corroborated by MoAI&WD officials,
including: scarcity of land, limited access to
improved farm inputs, lack of viable markets and
limited extension support. Land is a big
challenge for young people because ‘it is only the
elders and married people who have land of their
own to cultivate and not us the youth as we are
considered still part of our families’.3 As
discussed below, young people are marginalised
in access to inputs because they are not targeted
by the government-supported input programmes.
They argued: ‘We are told that we are fit enough
to work to obtain improved inputs on our own;
moreover most of us are not married and are not
supposed to need inputs since we are fed by our
families’.4 Markets are a problem since most
areas are inaccessible and it therefore ‘takes
time and effort to get the produce to lucrative
markets which at the end of the day might not be
worth it’.5 There is also a serious lack of loan
opportunities to boost agricultural activities.
Young women at Malemia Village, Malosa EPA,
Zomba District observed: ‘We are constrained in
taking agriculture seriously because there are no
sources of loans for us the youth to invest in the
sector. Even if there were loan opportunities,
most of us would still be reluctant to engage in
agriculture due to lack of extension support: we
haven’t had an extension officer in our area now
for six years’.6
Similar observations were made by Butt et al.
(2011) in their study of rural young people’s
perceptions in the Punjab, Pakistan. They also
pointed to lack of continuity in agricultural
policies, a politicised environment in agricultural
support institutions, isolation of agricultural
education, research and extension wings,
unfavourable prices, buyers and middlemen,
absence of infrastructure for farm exports,
deficient management and marketing skills, a
large number of small operations and
unproductive tenancy systems. 
The combination of these factors has given
agriculture a bad image among the young people
as a primary source of livelihood. Most of the
young people describe working in the agricultural
sector as ‘dirty work and demeaning’.7 There is a
widespread perception that ‘[agriculture] is not
rewarding and its benefits are long term’.8 Others
consider agriculture to be ‘simply the basic means
of survival’.9 For the young people in these areas,
therefore, there are three alternatives through
which they can realise their dreams of the good
life: (1) migrating to urban areas in search of
employment; (2) engaging in business; and
(3) migrating to South Africa. These are
considered the surest means of attaining ‘the good
life’, while agriculture is condemned as laborious,
less rewarding, exploitative and requiring a long
time to reap rewards. Young men of Ibrahim
Village, Katuli EPA, Mangochi District observed:
‘If you find a decent house with a TV screen and a
mountain bike, it is not because of farming; the
owners acquired them through other means, such
as working in South Africa and while there sent
money to their relatives to help them build houses
with burnt bricks, roofed with corrugated iron
sheets’. MoAI&WD officials concur: ‘The youth do
not see agriculture with all its inherent
challenges, particularly its low returns and a very
long gestation period as a means of attaining their
version of [the] good life’.10
It is striking, nevertheless, that the importance
of agriculture is widely acknowledged among
young people. In all the FGDs, young people
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indicated that agriculture was the mainstay for
their respective communities. However, this was
qualified by a clear statement that the majority
of people are in agriculture not by choice but
because they have no alternative. ‘Given a
choice, we would do other things for a living such
as business because agriculture is really
demanding and there are many factors working
against it’.11 They stressed that because of the
challenges facing the agricultural sector coupled
with the processes of land alienation, ‘We end up
working for others at very exploitative wages
which just locks us into a vicious circle of
poverty’.12 This contributes to the continuing low
maize productivity trap for smallholders in
Malawi (Dorward and Chirwa 2011). 
There is, however, an interesting counter
narrative associated mainly with MoAI&WD
officials. They argue that young people are
apparently disinterested in agriculture because
of their ignorance about the inherent potential
of agriculture to transform their lives. ‘The
problem is that the youth think of agriculture as
the domain of the elderly.’13 ‘They think, being
young and dynamic, they need to get rich fast –
which they feel is not possible working in the
agricultural sector but only through engaging in
more lucrative non-farm activities.’14 The
apparent disinterest of the youth in agriculture,
they argue, simply reflects ‘the lack of
understanding on the part of the youth of
agriculture as a business’.15 They nonetheless
acknowledge that MoAI&WD is partly to blame
for failing to expound a positive image of
agriculture due to the weak extension system.
There is, however, a strong feeling that young
people will be pushed back into agriculture as
the only feasible livelihood strategy due to the
worsening economic situation. This could
potentially be an opportunity ‘to change the
youth’s perception of agriculture as a sector
without viable possibilities to one where they can
realise their dreams of a good life’.16
3.2 Lack of supportive policy infrastructure
The policy environment in Malawi does not
encourage young people’s involvement in the
agri-food sector. Most MoAI&WD officials
observed that no policy framework has been put
in place to support the involvement of the youth
or cater for their interests in the sector since the
transition to democracy in May 1994. There has
been a major policy vacuum following the
dismantling of the Malawi Young Pioneer (MYP)
movement which provided a platform for young
people to learn various trades including farming
(Englund 2002). By the time they graduated from
the MYP training bases, ‘the youth were fully
equipped to embark on serious farming’.17
Without putting in place an alternative, ‘the
dismantling of the MYP marked the genesis of
pushing the youth to the periphery of agricultural
activities’.18 The MYP was dismantled amid
allegations that besides equipping young people
to become self-reliant, it also functioned as a
paramilitary agency for the Malawi Congress
Party. In this guise, the MYP was used to quell
dissent against the former one-party regime.
A critical review of major policy documents since
May 1994 is quite revealing. Young people are
not treated and targeted as a distinct category
needing attention in either the Poverty
Alleviation Programme (1994); Vision 2020
(1998); the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy
(2001); or the Malawi Growth and Development
Strategy (2006). Young people do not even
appear in the sections on cross-cutting issues
dominated by gender, HIV/AIDS, environment
and technology. Similar observations were made
by Bennel (2007): young people as a group are
not a priority of most governments in low-income
countries. He argued that ministries of youth are
generally very poorly resourced and are usually
subsumed or combined with other government
responsibilities, most commonly culture, sports
and education. The Economic Commission of
Africa made similar observations in its review of
the national poverty reduction strategy
programmes (PRSPs) across the continent in
2005: in only two of 12 PRSPs were young people
singled out as a special group in mainstreaming
employment and even here, urban youth were of
greater concern than rural youth (Bennel 2007).
Similarly at a global level, the 2007 World
Development Report on Youth devotes only four
paragraphs to how to expand rural opportunities
for young people and talks here mainly about
rural farm activities. The report overlooks the
urban youth entirely (ibid.).
The bias towards the non-agricultural sectors is
apparent in almost all Malawi government
initiatives that have targeted young people since
1994. These have focused on promoting
entrepreneurship among young people without
any particular emphasis on agri-business, the
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major ones being the Youth Revolving Fund
(MK 70 million in 1996); the Malawi Rural
Development Fund (MK 4 billion in 2005); and
the Youth Enterprise Development Fund
(MK 2 billion in 2009). According to Chinsinga
(2002), the major problem with initiatives of this
nature is that they are often heavily politicised
and the urban youth benefit disproportionately.
They are often targeted at ‘the supporters of the
prevailing governing party with no spillovers to
the agri-food sector’.19
The absence of a supportive policy infrastructure
is exacerbated by the reluctance of young
graduates from agriculture colleges to work in
rural areas. Therefore, even though a good
number of people have qualified as experts in
extension, the problem of farmers’ limited access
to extension services persists (Chinsinga 2007).
Graduates from Bunda College and the Natural
Resources College are reluctant to work in rural
areas because of poor living conditions and many
are hesitant to work in the public sector because
of low pay. As one official observed: ‘Graduates
are reluctant to work in rural areas because of
poor facilities; they are the “network” generation
which cannot imagine living in areas without
electricity, where phones cannot work, where
internet is inaccessible and roads are in a bad
shape’.20 There is an additional constraint for
those coming from the Natural Resources
College: ‘[These graduates] are not particularly
keen to work in the public sector because they
are keen to recoup the exorbitant fees for their
studies and most of them have never lived in rural
areas before’.21 Following the implementation of
structural adjustment programmes, the Natural
Resources College was privatised; it stopped
functioning as a public institution for
agricultural extensionists and started admitting
students on a market fee basis, putting pressure
on them to recoup their investment as soon as
possible (Chinsinga 2007). The fear among
MoAI&WD staff is that if this trend continues,
‘Very soon there will be a generation of farmers
that will be poorly equipped with agricultural
skills, worsening the image of agriculture as a
viable livelihood strategy’.22
3.3 Marginalisation of young people in agricultural
support programmes
Young people are marginalised in the
implementation of agricultural support
programmes in Malawi. This is unsurprising given
that almost all overarching development
strategies are silent on the role of the youth in the
sector. Both MoAI&WD officials and young people
themselves gave the Farm Input Subsidy
Programme as a classic example of how young
people are marginalised in the agricultural sector. 
FISP, as discussed above, provides farmers with
access to subsidised inputs through the use of
vouchers (Dorward and Chirwa 2011). The
criteria for targeting FISP have been a subject of
contentious debate. The main criticism has been
that the targeting criteria are both vague and
fluid, changing from year to year and varying
across the same areas within the same year. Most
official criteria focus on the elderly, widows,
orphans, female-headed households and other
vulnerable segments of society. Young people are
excluded, yet as one official noted, ‘Most of them
have either never gone to school or are just school
dropouts without a job or any tangible source of
capital to embark on meaningful farming’.23
However, since young people are clearly resource
constrained, ‘It is difficult to understand why they
are not the primary target of the programme’.24
Similar sentiments were echoed by young people
themselves. They observed: ‘We are cut out of
FISP; we cannot benefit from FISP in our own
right but only as members of our families, except
those in child-headed households’.25 As we have
seen, the justification for excluding the youth
from FISP is that they are strong enough to take
care of themselves. Yet opportunities for earning
income to raise the required capital are limited.
Young women from Ibrahim Village explained:
‘They tell us to go out to look for casual
labouring jobs to enable us to procure fertiliser,
but the only place we can get such work is from
the Greek estates where wages are quite
exploitative’. These sentiments illustrate how
rural Malawi is hard on the young people. As long
as they are in good health, they do not deserve
sympathy from communities around them. They
should be able to survive (Chinsinga 2004). 
Some MoAI&WD officials pointed to the
exclusion of the youth from FISP as a missed
opportunity in efforts to boost productivity of the
agri-food sector given Malawi’s current
demographic structure: ‘The ageing farming
population must be addressed in order to
guarantee sustainability in agricultural production
and food security in the country’.26 According to
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Suriname (n.d.), the production of food in the
SADC region (of which Malawi is part) will be
seriously undermined in the near future if young
farmers do not replace the minority ageing cohort.
The exclusion of young people is seen as a missed
opportunity because ‘the success of the agri-food
sector is likely to depend largely on the active
engagement of the youth since they comprise the
biggest proportion of the population’.27 The
argument is that in addition to sheer numbers,
‘the youth also have high levels of energy and since
farming in Malawi is predominantly manual, we
cannot rely on an ageing population’.28 Bennel
(2007) argues that young people should be
specifically targeted because they have
demonstrated greater propensity and willingness
to adopt new ideas and technology which may be
key to changing the way agriculture is
conceptualised, practised and perceived.
3.4 Land grabs in the eyes of young people
Both of the study areas are in districts affected by
programmes involving land alienation. In
Mangochi District about 400 hectares of land has
been sold to Greek farmers who mainly cultivate
maize and tobacco, while in Zomba District
smallholder farmers are being asked to
consolidate their land for purposes of promoting
large-scale irrigated agriculture. In this regard,
smallholder farmers are letting their pieces of
land to be part of one big piece of land for large-
scale irrigated agriculture. The justification is
that this would not only ensure that they reap the
benefits of economies of scale but also that all the
crop husbandry practices are done at the same
time as a collective. The drive to consolidate
landholdings is mainly through rehabilitating and
expanding the former government-run irrigation
schemes under the auspices of the GBI. In both
areas, young people believed: ‘We are at the
periphery of land transactions processes; we only
get to be told about the outcomes’.29 They
observed that land deals are dominated by local
chiefs and government officials with some
involvement of their parents while they
themselves are totally ignored ‘but we are the
future of this area’.30 Overall, young people
communicated a sense of powerlessness,
alienation and hopelessness about ongoing land
transactions, yet agriculture remains the
principal livelihood strategy for these areas.
The main concern among young people was that
the land deals are taking place at a time when the
average landholding per capita is declining mainly
due to rapid population growth (estimated at 3
per cent per annum: NSO 2008). The hardest hit
are young men who, in accordance with the
matrilineal cultural system, have to relocate to
their wives’ homesteads upon marriage. This
means they can only access land for agricultural
purposes through their wives. Here they observed:
‘The land accessed through marriage is often too
small to enable one to engage in productive and
viable agriculture’.31 The custom of relocation was
singled out as the most important factor for the
young men’s disinterest in agriculture in the area.
Young married men are often not keen ‘to invest
their hard-earned resources in “foreign land”
because they can be chased out at any time’.32
Several studies confirm that the matrilineal (and
matrilocal) system contributes significantly to soil
fertility degradation since men are not fully
committed to undertake the necessary
investments to maintain soil fertility (Cross 2002;
Kishindo 2004; Kachika 2009).
There are competing discourses among young
people about the land alienation in their areas.
For many it is a kind of ‘love–hate’ relationship.
Some young people see land grabs as a necessary
evil, given the huge challenges to them taking up
agriculture independently: ‘The new land owners
are creating employment and making it possible
for us to access improved seed and fertiliser
through contract farming arrangements’.
Similarly: ‘We are better off with the new land
owners since they provide us with seed, fertiliser
and some jobs that keep our lives going; the
government cannot afford to give us these
things, so at present we are better off with them
around’.33 For the young people subscribing to
this view, their argument was that acquisition of
land by foreigners should be facilitated as long as
effective mechanisms are put in place to ensure
that they give back to their neighbourhood
communities. This is in tune with the premise of
the GBI concept paper, in which GBI is justified
as creating employment opportunities for the
local communities whose land is acquired by
investors (GoM 2009). However, the question of
type of employment is not addressed at all.
Most of the young people in the study
condemned the land grabs as exploitative. They
argued that the land which is being offered to
investors should have been redistributed to
them. Although investors are providing some
Chinsinga and Chasukwa Youth, Agriculture and Land Grabs in Malawi74
employment opportunities, ‘very little attention
is given to the nature of employment; some of us
have been working for them [investors] for three
years and we are simply helping them get richer
and richer while we remain trapped in a vicious
circle of poverty’.34 Young people in Ibrahim
Village, Katuli EPA, cited the example of maize
contract farming they are engaged in. The estate
on which they work is involved in maize seed
production for Seed Co. While they sell maize to
the estate for MK50/kg, the estate sells to Seed
Co at MK200/kg. However this MK50 per kg is
not their net income because the estate then
deducts the cost of seed and fertiliser, and
charges a further MK1.00 per planting station
for the technical services and labour provided to
them. They therefore argued that ‘this is highly
exploitative with the estate behaving like a
money-lending institution’.35 The overall view of
the young people who subscribed to this
perspective was that the so-called investors are
simply using them as tools to generate wealth
while they descend deeper into poverty.
4 Conclusions
While agriculture remains the principal source
of livelihood in Malawi and young people are a
dominant constituent in the country’s
demographic structure, they are not fully
engaged in the sector. Young people are very
much at the periphery of agricultural processes
which is clearly reflected in their conception of a
good life. They do not see working in the
agricultural sector as a viable means of realising
their dreams, which they link instead to
employment in urban areas, engagement in non-
farm business enterprises and migration to
South Africa to do casual labour.
Both the government’s Farm Input Subsidy
Programme and Green Belt Initiative have
further marginalised the involvement of youth in
the agricultural sector. Young people are not
FISP beneficiaries although the majority are
resource constrained. The way in which young
people are treated under FISP is a clear
manifestation of the fact that rural Malawi is
tough on young people. As long as they are in
good health, they are expected to fend for
themselves. The implementation of the GBI is
further complicating young people’s access to
land, reducing the majority to casual labourers
on estates. The initiative does not inspire
confidence that the vexing land question will be
dealt with once and for all. The political and
bureaucratic elite are not keen on finalising
overdue land reforms because they are
protecting their own interests.
The current situation with regard to young
people is seen by officials and young people alike
as a missed opportunity, because they are the
future of the agricultural sector and will have to
replace the minority ageing farming population.
According to Suriname (n.d.), the strengths of
the youth in the sector include latent energy,
capacity and ability to produce and an excellent
source of ideas and innovation. The situation
that young people find themselves in is
exacerbated by policy that does not support their
productive involvement in agriculture. Add to
this the fact that increasing numbers of young
experts are shunning deployment to rural areas,
and it is clear why young people are ill-equipped
to deal with the challenges of starting up in
farming, even if they have the interest, land and
capital to do so.
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Notes
1 According to the 2002 land policy almost half of
the estates lie idle. This makes the smallholder
sector the major source of food security in the
country. It contributes as much as 80 per cent
of food production in Malawi while the estate
sector meets about 15 per cent and the rest
comes from either imports or food aid.
2 FGD with young men at Ibrahim Village, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District and young women,
Malemia Village, Malosa EPA, Zomba District.
3 FGD with young men, Katuli Village, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District.
4 FGD with young women, Ibrahim Village,
Katuli EPA, Mangochi District.
5 FGD with young men, Chitenjere Village,
Malosa EPA, Zomba District.
6 Ibid.
7 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District.
8 Ibid.
9 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Malosa
EPA, Zomba District.
10 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Malosa
EPA, Zomba District.
11 FGD with young men, Katuli Village, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District.
12 Ibid.
13 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Malosa
EPA, Zomba District.
14 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District.
15 Ibid.
16 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Malosa
EPA, Zomba District.
17 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District.
18 Ibid.
19 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Malosa
EPA, Zomba District.
20 Ibid.
21 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District.
22 Ibid.
23 Interview with an MoAI&WD official, Malosa
EPA, Zomba District.
24 Ibid.
25 FGD with young men, Ibrahim Village, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District.
26 Interview with District Agriculture
Development Office (DADO) official, Zomba
District.
27 Ibid.
28 Interview withan MoAI&WD official, Malosa
EPA, Zomba District.
29 FGD with young men, Ibrahim Village, Katuli
EPA, Zomba District.
30 FGD with young women, Malemia Village,
Malosa EPA, Zomba District.
31 FGD with young men, Katuli Village, Katuli
EPA, Mangochi District.
32 FGD with young men, Chitenjere Village,
Malosa EPA, Zomba District.
33 Ibid.
34 FGD with Youth, Ibrahim Village, Katuli EPA,
Mangochi District.
35 Ibid.
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